A burly mid-aged man of volatile emotions, stung by the gut of an Indian woman of Thatcherian countenance, struck back with nothing less than ‘those Indians are bastards’. A pained remark indeed, but it speaks of a living truth of the times when India was nothing but a patch on the world map – despised for its gall, ignored for all its worth and discriminated for its shades of brown skinned population. But time has a way of healing patches.[1]
On the eve of the 1971 India-Pakistan War, US President Richard Nixon, in his trademark ‘Nixonian diatribe’, hurled invectives at India and its then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Partnering him was his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger who called Gandhi a ‘bitch’ and Indians made for hapless ‘bastards.’[2] These were the days when Indians held promises of ‘hindu-rusi bhai bhai’ (Indians-Russians brothers forever) close to their hearts. India was hated by the West for its close ties to the USSR and more so for trying to disrupt the regional balance in South Asia by waging an endless war on the eastern borders of Pakistan (to win East Pakistan-now Bangladesh, its independence) in 1971.[3] They were infamous for their Non-Alignment Movement that scoffed at Western ownership of the world stage. India preferred to always ‘go it alone’ in her foreign policy and much against the West’s wishes, even if it brought to her international insignificance and, quite often, international ire.[4] Such was the case in the Indian summer of 1974, when a nuclear bomb was exploded at Pokharan, Rajasthan. India’s Tarapore nuclear power plant was aided by American ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology and plutonium, for in their thoughts they ‘trusted’ India.[5] They believed in India, for she would never mislead the West and perform against popular opinion an act of blasphemy as to use ‘peaceful’ technology transfers to make a bomb, and test it as well. But India had well enough reasons for doing so… not once, but twice, including the 1998 nuclear tests. The reasons being: a discomforting Pakistan agonised her as much as spectres of a nuclear China.[6] She was living at the threshold of a much-hated neighbourhood and her regional security pitted victory over getting some trusting pats from the US. But it meant disaster for the Indo-US ties. US passed economic, defence and nuclear export sanctions on India and endeavoured to isolate it further. That was the forlorn India of many years ago.[7]
A patch on the map, as she was, has grown-up since. But if it weren’t for George W. Bush, India would still be a brooding butt in the hides of a long tail.[8] Mainly in academia, the Bush administration and its doctrine are known for its ‘realism.’[9] In layman’s terms, realists are those who believe that the world is in a constant state of anarchy, where every nation cares to save its own skin. There is no interest paramount to what Darwin once pronounced, ‘survival of the fittest’, and so there is a race to becoming the best or tying up with the best to ensure safety.[10] In this world, there have to be some leaders who could also be called ‘hegemons’. In the Cold War era, the US and the USSR fought over this golden political position – to become the only ‘hegemon’ in the world. This was not a conventional war that involved arms and military but one that was fought with shrewd diplomacy on both sides as it culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Post-Cold War, the US remained the only side to tell the tale and decide the future storyline.[11] Soon enough, there emerged the fear of a growing China, an economic superpower that holds almost $800 billion of US national debt in the kitty of it international achievements.[12] Bush and his close aides over his two presidential terms – Condoleezza Rice, Nic Burns, Rumsfeld and Dick Lugar among others – were all in line with this realist-reality that China poses a threat beyond recognition to US hegemony in the world. To ‘contain’ China would be implausible but there could be other ways to deal with it.[13] There was a dual programme in the US strategic policy for this purpose, as was mentioned in the National Security Strategy of the Bush Administration in 2002.[14] First was to co-opt it into the international society or what is now being discussed as ‘socialising of China into the international system’ and simultaneously to forge partnerships with other Asian powers to help them grow to even out Chinese regional might.[15] This is where India came into the picture.[16]
India was then and is now the world’s largest democracy; a political order that is absolutely consonant with America’s greater missionary goal of turning the whole world into a democracy.[17] America believes that democracy is the most peaceful form of governance. Besides, economists foretell that India is soon to become world’s third-largest economy[18] and a partnership with her would also mean the coming of business contracts to American firms. Finally, this means she has in her the ability to become a power at par with China – only with little push from Bush.[19] And so it was decided. Ties with India became an issue of ‘high priority’ in Bush’s Foreign Policy and some called it Bush’s only real achievement. The strategic partnership won widespread support, including support from Kissinger who also apologised for ‘bastarding’ the Indians.[20]
Meanwhile, the non-aligning tendencies of India forced the Indian government to well, not align with the US so easily. India insisted on helping only if help came their way. They had suffered for decades from US sanctions and the world turning its eye on them.[21] India felt ignored by the international community, despite being a power of such geopolitical might and fast growing economically as well. She wanted empowerment and recognition. India asked the US to remove sanctions and form an alliance based on transfers of nuclear energy and technology.[22] Bush agreed, but this meant waging a war of words on Capitol Hill and at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meetings. India never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refused to stop its nuclear program. Hence, she really didn’t deserve to get nuclear technology, especially since it meant altering the US Atomic Energy Act at domestic level and the NSG guidelines internationally, to adjust her as an exception to the rule.[23] But Bush had made up his mind, as he was ready to sacrifice the face of all international non-proliferation efforts and make way for America’s personal security concerns.[24] India got what it wanted and maybe much more than just recognition. India is the only de facto nuclear-armed state in the world that is not a signatory of NPT, yet she enjoys all privileges of a nuclear power.[25] Indian media appraised the US-Indo civil nuclear energy agreement as a slap on Pakistan’s face, a kick to China where it hurts the most, and a friendship with the world’s mightiest power…but, how long will this ‘new India’ last?
Already, the Obama Administration has picked its hay from the muck bag. India was visibly absent from the inaugural list of Obama’s foreign policy partners and priorities. An estranged beloved, she wasn’t even among the first dozen world leaders who received Obama’s call soon after incumbency to White House.[26] He has asked NSG nations to strengthen their national policies, so as to disallow non-signatory nations from enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear items and technology.[27] India knows what is in store for her. She is beginning to get hurt by the constant snubbing. She can see Pakistan is getting a favourable treatment vis-à-vis Afghanistan. In such circumstances, what is going to be India’s next step in maintaining her international status? The world awaits…
[1] BBC News ‘Kissinger regrets India comments’, (July 1, 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4640773.stm
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid
[4] Thakur, Ramesh; ‘India After Nonalignment’, Foreign Affairs (Spring 1992) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47767/ramesh-thakur/india-after-nonalignment
[5] CRS Report 33016 (2006) pp. 1
[6] Mearsheimer, J; ‘India Needs the Bomb’ NY Times (2000)
[7] CNN News; ‘US Imposes Sanctions on India’, (May 13, 1998) http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/
[8] ASPEN Ideas Festival 2008 ‘Why India Matters Meet’ with Robert Blackwill et al http://www.aifestival.org/audio-video-library.php?menu=365&action=full_info&qclip=1
[9] Gonsalves, Eric (ed. Chari); ‘Indo-US Nuclear Deal’ (2009) pp. 26
[10] Cooney, Kevin et al; ‘The Rise of China and International Security’ (2009) pp.7
[11] Gilbert, Alan; ‘Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism’ (1999) p.4
[12] The Christian Science Monitor, ‘Is China Turning Bearish on the US Treasury’ (2010) http://www.csmonitor.com/Money/Tax-VOX/2010/0219/Is-China-Turning-Bearish-on-the-U.S.-Treasury
[13] ASPEN Ideas Festival 2008 ‘Why India Matters Meet’ with Robert Blackwill et al http://www.aifestival.org/audio-video-library.php?menu=365&action=full_info&qclip=1
[14] Mastanduno, Michael (ed. Beeson); ‘Bush and Asia’ (2006), pp. 32-33
[15] Ibid
[16] Mearsheimer, J; ‘India Needs the Bomb’ NY Times (2000)
[17] Ibid
[18] Reuters News; ‘Merrill to hire team from JPMorgan in India-report’ (March 9, 2010) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSGE62802O20100309?type=marketsNews
[19] ASPEN Ideas Festival 2008 ‘Why India Matters Meet’ with Robert Blackwill et al http://www.aifestival.org/audio-video-library.php?menu=365&action=full_info&qclip=1
[20] BBC News ‘Kissinger regrets India comments’, (July 1, 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4640773.stm
[21] Talbott, Strobe; ‘Engaging India’ (2004), pp. 4
[22] CRS Report 33016, 2006, pp. 3
[23] Ibid, pp. 1
[24] Perkovich, George; ‘Global Implications of the US-India Deal’, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2010) pp. 21-28
[25] Pant, Harsh; ‘The US India Nuclear Pact’, Asian Security (2009) pp. 292
[26] Twining, Dan; ‘India needs a lot more love from Obama’, Foreign Policy (Feb 20, 2009) http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/20/india_needs_a_lot_more_love_after_all_its_in_our_interest
[27] Pant, Harsh ‘Obama jeopardizing nuclear deal with India’ (July 25, 2009) http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090725a1.html
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